Let me start this communiqué by stating that the happiest, make that most relieved, person in America yesterday had to be Elliot Spitzer. It is a great bit of irony that on the day that he is scheduled to hand over the keys to Albany in disgrace, the very Wall Street bankers that he so zealously pursued as District Attorney steal all the headlines, saving him from further shame.
Now, on to Bear, Stearns. By now it is well known that JP Morgan Chase, with liquidity provided by the Fed, has purchased Bear, Stearns for about $236mm, or $2.00 per share, in the face of the company’s imminent demise. One could speculate that Morgan was generous in their offer as any company worth only $2.00, as compared to a closing price of upwards of $70.00 earlier last week, was potentially worth nothing. Given that it could prove difficult to bid $0 for something and actually get it, Morgan had to put some positive number on the table and, viola, the entire company is purchased at $2.00. The beauty of the deal, and the portion that might make Pierpont proud, is that, seemingly, the Federal Reserve has agreed, in addition to financing the overall purchase, to guarantee Morgan against losses on the most risky (read as “worthless”) portion of Bear’s portfolio comprised, in large part, of mortgage securities.
It is, to me, somewhat hard to believe that this maverick, blue-collar trading house founded over eighty five years ago, our fifth largest investment bank and one of only a handful who eschew retail business, a firm that survived the Great Depression, World War II, the economy of the seventies, the Savings and Loan Crisis, Black Monday, the dot-com bubble, and myriad lesser economic and financial shocks, would allow itself to be brought to its knees by something so mundane as home mortgages. Of course, we all know that home mortgages, once out of the hands of the originators, are not quite what they used to be and that the “securities” (used loosely) held by Bear, Stearns and its colleagues were, and are, anything but vanilla. Yet, whatever instruments one holds, and however esoteric these instruments may be, the question still begs, “Where was the risk control?”
Like a good bookie, the secret to running a good investment bank is to always be neutral. You underwrite bonds, you mark them up, you sell them to your customers, you earn the spread and you go home flat. The risk to your firm’s equity is minimized and you make money the old fashioned way, slowly. But slowly, in this age of investment banks who have moved away from the time-tested partnership structure and embraced the publicly traded corporate format whereby management’s feet are seldom held to the fire by nameless, faceless shareholders, just won’t cut it anymore. Quarterly results and year-end bonuses have pushed these firms to the edges, and, obviously, sometimes over the edges, of their particular skill sets. Rather than confine themselves to underwriting fees and security markups, Wall Street has, for many years now, pushed the envelope and consistently put more firm equity at risk in ventures like trading their own portfolios, hedge-fund management, and etc. The problem with this approach is that there are very, very few prolific traders out there and most of them are well aware that they can make much more money on their own than they could ever make within the walls of any investment bank. So then, guess who is running these trading portfolios? Correct, the less experienced and less skilled end of the trading herd. And this, even for corporate executives whose entire net worth is not tied to the fate of the company, makes management nervous.
Arrive the quant. Wall Street, and its customers, loves quantitative analysis. When you have the propeller-head in your office and he is describing to you the various mathematical formulae that work together to form his model, your eyes must, at some point, glaze over, your head must fall back, your ears must become numb, and you must substitute every dizzying word out of the quant’s mouth from that point on as “black box.”
“The “black box” will tell us what securities to own.”
“The “black box” will tell us when to add to our position.”
“ The “black box” will tell us what to use as a hedge.”
“The “black box” will keep us delta neutral.”
And then the real kicker,
“The “black box” will enable us to use our excess equity to supercharge our earnings and consistently increase firm revenue and, importantly, executive compensation and bonuses, regardless of market direction or the state of the underwriting environment!”
“I like this idea. Let’s do it. But wait, let’s not limit ourselves to one “black box,” let’s get lot’s of them.”
LTCM had a black box. So did Amaranth. So did Bear, Stearns. So does most everyone else from investment banks, to hedge-funds, to deposit banks. The black box is fine and quantitative analysis is certainly an important part of the financial world. We must, though, be mindful of the human element and the wisdom gained from experience. We must, though, give proper respect to risk. Risk in financial markets takes on a variety of forms, with liquidity risk being the one that seems to be most often overlooked by the quants; the “black box” just can’t seem to calculate for it. Based on the “black box,” a firm takes huge positions in derivative instruments whose value is based on mortgage backed securities. What you have, in effect, is a derivative of a derivative. So, how does the firm hedge this position? Of course, there is no perfect hedge. There is no futures contract which mirrors this derivative. The only choices are to structure an OTC hedge, to stay naked, or to offset the position with more liquid securities which, while not exactly a true hedge, should perform in a way which somewhat mirrors the position. My guess is that the hedge often takes the form of a combination of the three just mentioned strategies. As such, the quants believe they have limited the risks.
Ah, but there’s that liquidity factor again. Even if the bank hedged these derivatives in one form or another, suppose huge sell orders were to come along at or near the same time? The “black box” says the chances of that are minimal as housing prices always go up and defaults always remain within a tight range. Further, the banks have the hedge funds who are anything but risk averse and who are constantly screaming for product. Should there be any kind of systemic stress, they could sell big chunks to them, financed, of course, and move them off of the bank’s books. Or, better still, these derivatives can be packaged into more pools and sold to institutions. Even further, Bear, Stearns, and every other bank has known for years now that they have the “Greenspan Put” to back them up. Should a big customer get into serious trouble, it is a given that the government, or some agency thereof, is going to engineer a bailout. The risks are minimal and the returns are great.
All this is to say that, not unlike tulipomania, the enticements of excessive returns have once again masked the assumptions of risk. In spite of the massive amounts of computational technology we have at our disposal, we are no further along, when it comes to evaluating risk and reward, than were the Phoenicians. From Nobel Laureates and master bridge players to you and I, we can all become intoxicated with thoughts of success and wealth to the point of ignoring dangers that lie less than an arm’s length away. The story of Bear, Stearns is anything but new. The same questions asked after every debacle will be asked now and are sure to be asked again at some point in the not too distant future. There will forever exist fear and greed and when one of these factors grossly outweighs the other, harsh ramifications are sure to follow.
__________________